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We examine mortgage pricing before and after Switzerland was the first country 
to activate the Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III. Observing multiple 
mortgage offers per request, we obtain three core findings. First, capital-
constrained and mortgage-specialized banks raise their rates relatively more. 
Second, risk-weighting schemes supposed to discriminate against more risky 
borrowers do not amplify the effect of higher capital requirements. Third, CCB-
subjected banks and CCB-exempt insurers raise mortgage rates, but insurers 
raise rates by on average 8.8 bp more. To conclude, lenders welcome the 
opportunity to increase mortgage rates, but stricter capital requirements do not 
discourage banks from risky mortgage lending. 
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1. Introduction 
In February 2013 Switzerland became the first country to activate the Counter-Cyclical Capital 
Buffer (CCB) as the macro-prudential tool of Basel III. Its first Swiss activation required banks to 
hold extra equity capital worth 1% of their issued risk-weighted residential mortgages.  
This paper investigates the impact of the CCB’s increased capital requirements on mortgage 
pricing. We shed light on different bank balance sheet characteristics including capitalization, 
business model, portfolio and funding structure that might render banks more sensitive to the 
effects of the CCB. As risk-weighting schemes tied to loan-to-value (LTV) ratios link the 
riskiness of individual borrowers to the regulatory capital requirements of banks, we also 
examine whether these threshold LTV ratios amplify the CCB effects. We exploit a 
comprehensive dataset of a Swiss online mortgage broker, which allows us to separate mortgage 
demand from mortgage supply. Customers provide detailed information on their financial 
situation and the real estate property they intend to buy. Then, each mortgage request receives 
several binding but independent offers by banks and insurance companies. As we observe 
responses from both banks and insurers, we can also analyze the effect on insurers which do not 
need to comply with the CCB’s capital requirements.  
Our study yields three core findings. First, capital-constrained banks and banks that are 
specialized in the mortgage business raise their offered mortgage rates relatively more. Hence, 
banks do not only charge more on new mortgages after the CCB, but also do specialized banks 
recover the costs of higher capital requirements for mortgages already on their balance sheets. 
Indeed, these specialized banks pass higher costs on to new mortgage customers. Second, banks 
in general charge more on very risk mortgages with critical LTV ratios above respectively 66% 
and 80%, but these threshold LTVs do not amplify the CCB effects. Risk-weighting schemes put 
an extra equity levy in terms of equity capital requirements on mortgages with LTV ratios above 
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66% and again with LTV ratios above 80%. One might hence anticipate that banks claim extra 
compensation for granting these more equity capital-intensive mortgages in general and even 
more so after the CCB imposes higher capital standards. However, we find that banks price these 
LTV thresholds, but risk-weighting schemes do not amplify the CCB effect. In this light, we 
might interpret LTV thresholds as signals for very risky mortgages inducing all lenders to charge 
a risk premium. Apparently, the existing risk-weighting schemes create only a relatively weak 
link between LTV ratios and capital requirements. Our third finding suggests that banks and 
insurers increase their average mortgage rates after the CCB’s activation, but insurers raise rates 
by on average 8.8 bp more than banks. For this reason we infer that in the Swiss mortgage market 
there has been little “policy leakage” in the sense of CCB-exempt insurers seeking to underbid 
CCB—subjected banks. By contrast, we find that insurers aim for higher profits rather than 
seeking to expand their market share. We interpret this as the insurers’ attempt to reap additional 
profits in a low interest rate environment with scarce profitable investment opportunities. 
Generally speaking, the CCB activation raises mortgage rates but neither banks nor insurers 
become more reluctant to offer mortgages.  
To conclude, both types of mortgage lenders welcome the opportunity of higher capital 
requirements on banks to raise mortgage rates and potentially expand their profits. Yet, common 
risk-weighting schemes associated with the Basel capital standards do not amplify the CCB effect 
and thus do not prevent banks from offering very risky mortgages. 
Our unique setup and dataset allow us to advance the understanding of the effects of the CCB 
as the macro-prudential policy tool of Basel III in a number of ways. First, Switzerland was the 
first country worldwide to activate the CCB. This allows us to assess how higher bank capital 
requirements affect the willingness of banks to make a mortgage and the explicit pricing of 
mortgages. Second, our dataset allows us to disentangle mortgage supply and mortgage demand 
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as several banks submit independent offers for each anonymized mortgage request. We can thus 
attribute differences in the pricing of banks to their idiosyncratic balance sheet characteristics that 
might strengthen a bank’s sensitivity to higher capital requirements. As banks cannot observe 
their competitors’ offers and participation, we put forward that individual offers are not distorted 
by superior knowledge, private information or aspects of competition. Third, we study the 
effectiveness of risk-weighting schemes on the pricing of returns to a specific asset class. In 
general, risk-weighting schemes specify how risk characteristics of a certain asset class translate 
into bank-specific regulatory capital requirements. We examine how a positive shock to capital 
requirements on an asset class that is possibly amplified by risk-weighting schemes shapes a 
bank’s pricing of that assets class. Our results hence also inform the debate on the appropriate 
design of the risk-weights to exercise incentive effects that might contribute to make asset 
portfolios more resilient towards shocks. Fourth, our comparison of banks with insurers allows us 
to track possible leakage effects of a regulatory measure that targets some market participants but 
may also have an indirect effect on other market participants.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section sketches the regulatory 
background of Basel III, the specific tool of the CCB as well as its implementation and activation 
in Switzerland. It also outlines the relevant literature. Section 3 presents our dataset and Section 4 
our empirical approach with regression specifications and results. Section 5 concludes and 
discusses potential policy implications as well as possible avenues for future research. 
 
5 
2. The CCB and its Higher Capital Requirements 
2.1  Switzerland as the first country to activate the CCB  
The Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer (CCB) is the macro-prudential component of the Basel III 
banking regulation published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010a). 
In Switzerland, Basel III entered into force on January 1, 2013. The purpose of the CCB is to 
address the pro-cyclicality of bank capital requirements implied by earlier sets of the Basel 
regulation. In that previous regulation, risk weights were tied to the estimated probability of 
default which however tended to fall in periods of high credit growth.1 Thus lending was made 
less expensive in periods in which growth was already high and vice-versa, thus reinforcing the 
credit cycle. In response, the Basel Committee developed the CCB (BCBS, 2010b). 
The CCB comes on top of the minimum capital requirement (MCR) already in place under 
Basel II and the capital conservation buffer also introduced by Basel III. The minimum 
requirement amounts to 8% of risk-weighted assets (RWA) and its violation will automatically 
trigger regulatory action. The capital conservation buffer acts as a cushion when equity capital 
temporarily falls in times of financial market turmoil. Its size depends on regulators’ assessment 
of a bank’s systemic importance. In Switzerland it ranges from 2.5% to 6.4% of RWA, depending 
on which out of 5 risk groups a bank has been assigned to. FINMA (2011) and Jans & Passardi 
(2013) provide more details on the implementation of the minimum capital requirement and the 
capital conservation buffer in Switzerland. 
In contrast to these permanent requirements, Swiss national authorities can impose the CCB as 
an additional temporary capital requirement whenever they deem credit growth excessive. The 
Basel Committee (BCBS, 2010b) stated two official objectives for doing so. First, by requiring 
 
1
 See for instance Gordy and Howells (2006) or Aikman et al (2014), as well as the relevant papers cited therein. 
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the build-up of additional equity capital in periods of high credit growth, the aim was to 
strengthen lenders’ resilience to potential loan losses when the risk of such losses increases.2 
Second, under the common assumption that internal finance is more expensive than external 
finance (which often enjoys tax privileges), higher capital requirements should also make lending 
more expensive and thus slow down credit growth when the buffer is activated. 
The Basel III accords in general and the CCB in particular have been and are being 
implemented in different countries at different points in time. In Switzerland, Basel III has in 
general entered into force on 1 January 2013, with phase-in periods for some requirements. By 
contrast, in view of a potential real estate bubble, national authorities’ ability to activate the CCB 
was already implemented into Swiss law in July 2012. According to the general Basel III 
framework, the CCB applies to all risk-weighted assets. In deviation from this, the Swiss setup 
allows the authorities to activate the CCB only for part of banks’ portfolios. In this light, Swiss 
authorities decided to restrict the first activation of the CCB to risk-weighted domestic residential 
mortgages in order to address a potential housing bubble without risking to cause a credit crunch 
in other bank lending activities. Upon recommendation by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and 
after consultation of the supervisor FINMA, the Swiss government activated the CCB on 13 
February 2013. It required banks to raise additional CET 1 capital worth 1% of their risk-
weighted domestic residential mortgages by September 2013.3 4 
To disentangle the effects of the CCB’s activation, one must also pay attention to other changes 
in regulation affecting the Swiss mortgage market. As common in Switzerland during the past 
years, the Swiss Bankers Association has published such sets of regulatory standards as so-called 
 
2
 There has also been a lively discussion of which indicators would be suitable to time activation and release of the CCB. See Drehmann et al. 
(2010), Drehmann et al. (2011), Repullo & Saurina (2011), Edge & Meisenzahl (2011), Hahm & Shin (2013), BOE (2014). 
3
 About a year later, in January 2014, that requirement was furthermore raised to 2%, to be fulfilled by July 2014, but that increase is not 
investigated here for lack of data on the subsequent period. 
4
 For further details on the first activation of the CCB, see SNB (2013a) and SNB (2013b). 
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self-regulation guidelines. The supervisor FINMA has recognized them as universal standards 
and broadened their scope to all banks. First qualitative guidelines on mortgage lending were 
published in Swiss Bankers Association (2011). After pressure from the authorities, these were 
complemented by additional requirements in Swiss Bankers Association (2012), which entered 
into force in July 2012. Since then, households must provide at least 10% of the house value as 
“hard” equity not taken from pension assets. Furthermore, new borrowers are required to reduce 
their LTV ratio to a maximum of two-thirds within 20 years, countering Swiss tax incentives to 
keep debt high as long as allowed by the mortgage contract. To ensure that we disentangle effects 
of the CCB activation from these regulatory changes, our sample starts in July 2012, so that the 
same customer guidelines apply throughout our sample period. Figure 1 illustrates the different 
periods of our sample. Finally, note that both the CCB and the self-regulation apply to all banks 
contained in our sample, including subsidiaries of foreign banks, but neither applies to insurers. 
As outlined in FINMA (2014), insurers account for about 4% of Swiss residential mortgage 
lending. We elaborate on the role of insurers in Subsection 4.4. 
2.2  By how much might the CCB increase mortgage rates? 
This section develops a back of the envelope estimate for the anticipated increase in mortgage 
rates that banks charge after the CCB’s activation. Initially we gauge the additional cost that a 
bank incurs when funding 1% of a risk-weighted mortgage with equity rather than debt. Figure 2 
computes the cost differential for a bank that intends to make a mortgage worth CHF 1mn. As 
published in the most recent report by the Swiss National Bank (see SNB, 2012), we draw on the 
Swiss market-wide average risk-weight of 40% and hence assume a corresponding loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio of about 77%. This implies a risk-weighted mortgage amount of CHF 400’000. 
Hence, the 1% CCB implies an additional equity capital requirement worth CHF 4’000. As the 
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bank has to replace debt by equity capital funding, we have to multiply those CHF 4’000 with the 
cost differential between equity and debt finance. Based on the public annual reports of the banks 
in our sample, we compute an average cost differential of 3.84%. To proxy this cost differential 
we take the difference between the average reported return on equity and the average ratio of 
interest expenses to external funding by deposits and bonds. Ultimately we arrive at an extra cost 
worth CHF 154, or 1.54 bp when set in relation to the mortgage amount. 
Indeed, a bank has 3 options to comply with the CCB’s stricter capital requirement when 
offering a mortgage. First, it can add less than those 1.54 bp to its previous mortgage rates and 
incur part of this cost itself in an attempt to underbid competitors. Second, it can pass on exactly 
this amount and thereby pass on the additional cost of the respected mortgage to the customer. 
Third, it can add more than this amount to its previously charged mortgage rates for two reasons. 
On the one hand, a bank might welcome this opportunity to boost its profits as customers know 
that mortgages will become more expensive because of the CCB for each given bank refinancing 
interest rate. On the other hand, if a bank is very specialized in mortgage lending, it carries a 
balance sheet burden as the CCB applies to existing and new mortgages. In this sense, a bank 
might pass on not only the additional cost for the new mortgage, but it might attempt to roll over 
part of its imposed cost burden that ensues from issued mortgages with mortgage rates having 
been contracted in the past. Section 4.2 provides more details on which balance sheet 
characteristics render a bank particularly sensitive to the CCB’s effects.  
To sum up, one might expect the CCB to generate extra cost of about 1.54 bp for an average 
mortgage and a bank might incur part of this cost itself, add exactly this amount to its previous 
mortgage rates or raise mortgage rates by even more. 
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2.3  Existing Literature 
While there has been some work on the need for more counter-cyclical instruments as well as 
on possible conditioning variables, work on the effects of a CCB once implemented is very 
limited. As Switzerland was the first country to activate a CCB in February 2013, empirical 
evaluations of the CCB as included in Basel III do to the best of our knowledge not yet exist. Yet 
several strands of the literature relate to our paper. 
First, there is a literature on how actual bank capitalization affects bank lending. On the theory 
side, Boot et al. (1993), Sharpe (1990), Diamond and Rajan (2000) develop models that examine 
how equity capital should affect bank lending. Gersbach and Rochet (2012) build a simple model 
of bank lending and show that the volatility of lending can be reduced by requiring higher capital 
ratios in boom times. With respect to the regulatory framework, Repullo and Suarez (2004) 
investigate how the transition from Basel I to Basel II translates into changes in a theoretical loan 
pricing equation. On the empirical side, Hubbard et al. (2002) find that banks with low capital 
demand higher rates from borrowers with high switching costs. Steffen and Wahrenburg (2008) 
find support for this result in their analysis of UK loans. Santos and Winton (2010) point out that 
less well capitalized banks are more sensitive to their customers’ characteristics than better 
capitalized ones. Kashyap and Stein (2000) find that banks with less liquid balance sheets exhibit 
a stronger lending effect in response to a monetary policy shock. Kishan and Opiela (2000) stress 
that the degree of capitalization matters in that small and less well capitalized banks respond most 
strongly to monetary policy. Based on Italian data, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004 and 2014) 
measure capitalization not simply as the absolute capital to assets ratio, but as the percentage 
deviation of that ratio from its regulatory minimum. We borrow this measure of capitalization to 
proxy the sensitivity of banks towards a regulatory capital shock.  
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More specifically on the effects of regulatory capital requirements, several papers conduct 
mostly accounting-based quantitative impact studies (QIS) on the effect of capital requirements 
on loan pricing. These include Cournède and Slovik (2000), Elliot (2009), King (2010), 
Cosimano and Hakura (2011) and Hanson et al. (2011).  
While assuming that the costs of equity and debt remain unchanged, Cournède and Slovik 
(2000) draw on a balance sheet identity and apply it to aggregate data of different industrialized 
countries. This approach implicitly corresponds to our back of the envelope concept as we draw 
on the same set of assumptions and let the analogous ratios enter our compution. To put our back 
of the envelope estimate of 1.54 bp into perspective, it is important to recognize that estimates 
crucially hinge on the assumed average risk-weight applied to the mortgage as well as on the 
difference between the cost of debt and equity funding. The cost differential used in the studies 
cited above ranges from 7.7% for Japan to 12.7% for the US as opposed to 3.84% in our sample 
of Swiss banks. Their average risk-weight applied to all assets ranges from 53.9% for the Euro 
area and 76.4% for the US as opposed to the average risk weight of 40% based on the Swiss 
mortgages market. This might explain why their estimated impact of a 1% increase in equity 
capital applying to all risk-weighted assets ranges from 8.4 bp for Japan, 14.3 bp for the Euro 
area and 20.5 bp for the US, respectively and thus considerably exceeds our back of the envelope 
estimate applied to risk-weighted mortgages only and a much lower cost differential. 
More specifically on the CCB, Drehmann and Gambacorta (2012) run a simulation of the CCB 
effects on bank lending and find that the buffer can indeed slow down credit growth during 
booms and moderate a credit contraction once it is released. 
The closest to an empirical evaluation of the Basel III CCB by use of micro-level data is the 
work by respectively Aiyar et al (2012) and Jiménez et al. (2012). Aiyar et al (2012) evaluate the 
effects of bank-specific capital requirements in the UK that, while not being part of an explicit 
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“macro-prudential policy”, used to vary counter-cyclically already since Basel I. On the theory 
side, they point out that for counter-cyclical capital requirements to affect mortgage lending, 
banks must not be too over-capitalized relative to regulatory requirements from the outset. Our 
analysis pays special attention to the issue of excess capitalization against the background of 
Swiss banks during the phase-in period of Basel III5. Aiyar et al (2012) also emphasize that the 
purpose of counter-cyclical capital requirements may be defeated when there exists a set of 
lenders to whom the requirements do not apply.6 This motivates our analysis of the lending 
response of insurers in Switzerland. 
Jiménez et al. (2012) by contrast evaluate the effects of “dynamic provisioning” introduced by 
Spain already in 2000. The policy required provisioning conditional also on system-wide 
indicators rather than only bank-specific losses. As Crowe et al. (2011) point out, counter-
cyclical provisioning differs from counter-cyclical capital requirements along the important 
dimension that the requirements are binding also when banks are already better capitalized than 
required by regulators. Jiménez et al. (2012) use bank, loan and firm level data to analyze the 
impact of these provisions on bank lending to firms. They find that the countercyclical 
provisioning rules did indeed help to smooth the Spanish credit cycle. 
2.4  Defining the scope of our paper 
Our paper differs in several respects from the above-cited work. First, we empirically analyze 
the specific CCB as the macro-prudential tool of Basel III. Second, we focus on mortgages and 
hence bank lending to private households rather than bank lending to firms as mostly analyzed in 
the literature (see i.e. Cornett et al., 2011, Jiménez et al., 2012, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2014). 
 
5
 Swiss banks must attain the capital conservation buffer requirements mentioned in Section (2.1) between 2013 and 2019. 
6
 This potential weakness is also mentioned in European Systemic Risk Board (2014) 
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Third, we do not only analyse the propensity of banks to make a loan (like for instance Jiménez et 
al., 2012), but also do we explicitly investigate the pricing of independent offers per individual 
mortgage request. In doing so, we exploit data on binding mortgage offers submitted by banks 
with specified mortgage rates and conditions. To examine mortgage supply, we can take request 
fixed effects to switch off any aspects of borrower risk in order to analyze how a bank’s portfolio 
structure, capitalization and business affect mortgage pricing before and after the CCB’s 
activation. To examine mortgage demand, we can take lender fixed effects to analyze how 
borrower risk translates into mortgage pricing before and after the CCB. This allows us to go 
beyond merely assessing the aggregate rise in lending spreads. To examine possible leakage 
effects, we compare the mortgage pricing of insurers to that of banks. 
As indicated above, the Basel Committee explicitly lists two goals of the counter-cyclical 
capital buffer. First, banks are to hold more equity capital to bear potential losses and thus 
become more resilient to potential credit losses. Our paper abstains from analyzing whether 
banks have indeed strengthened their capital base after the CCB’s activation. But it assesses 
whether better capitalized banks, banks with more corporate or reserve capital and banks which 
have just increased their equity capital respond differently to the CCB. Second, the CCB is to 
slow down lending growth during booms by making lending more expensive. This paper 
examines whether banks become indeed more or less reluctant to make new mortgages, how the 
effect of the CCB on pricing depends on bank characteristics, and whether banks charge extra for 
very risky mortgages before and after the CCB’s activation.  
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3. Data 
The online platform Comparis intermediates many financial services for private households and 
it provides us with the data of their mortgage platform. Customers pay CHF 148 (about USD 160 
as of 2014) and submit comprehensive information on the real estate property to be bought, their 
household finances and the requested mortgage amount and maturity model. Comparis sends the 
anonymized customer request to different mortgage lenders. As common in Switzerland, banks 
and big insurance companies constitute the supply side on the Swiss mortgage market. Having 
screened the customers, mortgage lenders then decide whether to make a binding offer and at 
which mortgage rate and conditions. Indeed, lenders have an incentive to submit competitive 
offers while knowing that customers will most likely have a choice among on average almost five 
independent offers from banks and insurers. These offers vary across mortgage interest rates, 
while lenders cannot deviate from the requested mortgage amount. 
This dataset forms the backbone of our paper and it has several remarkable features that suit 
our empirical analysis. First, it allows us to distinguish between mortgage demand and supply. In 
particular, we observe several distinct offers by lenders on the supply curve for each mortgage 
demand request instead of a market outcome. Second, all lenders receive exactly the same set of 
anonymized information on the customer and the underlying real estate property. For our 
analysis, we can draw on exactly the same set of borrower information as banks do, plus all 
details on offers and conditions subsequently received by applicants. Third, lenders do neither 
know which competitors participate nor do they observe the details of their competitors’ offers. 
These features assure that lenders submit binding offers that truly reflect their eagerness to bid for 
the mortgage without distorting aspects of competition or superior knowledge. Fourth, since the 
request is costly and since offers are binding conditional on verifiable information, customers 
have an incentive to submit correct information.  
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To avoid any distortions, we restrict our view to 10 year fixed rate mortgages which account 
for the lion’s share of requested mortgage models (see our companion paper Basten and Koch, 
2014).7 While some offers carry only a single rate for the entire mortgage, others carry different 
rates for different tranches. In that case we compute the tranche-weighted average mortgage rate 
for each offer.  
 
Table 1 presents our database in terms of demand and supply participation. Column (1) refers to 
the period CCB=0. That period starts on July 1, 2012 when the new lending standards came into 
force and the CCB becomes a legal option for the Swiss authorities. It ends on February 12, 2013, 
the day before the CCB was actually activated. Column (2) ranges from the activation of the CCB 
on February 13, 2012 until the end of our sample on October 24, 2013 (CCB=1). Figure 1 
illustrates both time periods. Our data on mortgage demand show that the number of requests 
declines slightly over time. We attribute this to the fact that initially Comparis was the only major 
online mortgage platform in Switzerland, whereas later other platforms went online, too. 
However, the average LTV remains at about 65%, such that the composition of applicants 
appears to be stable over time8. Furthermore, in our empirical analysis below month fixed effects 
are to absorb any aggregate changes that might affect all lenders. 
Turning to mortgage supply, Table 1 exhibits a declining total number of answers for both 
lenders in total as well as individually. Customers receive on average 5.9 (=3873/661) answers in 
the period before the CCB shock and 4.8 (=2461/516) answers after it. Most importantly, the 
shares of offers and rejections relative to the total number of answers are fairly stable over time. 
On average, 85.54% of received answers are offers before the activation of the CCB and 87.2% 
 
7
 We repeat our analyses with the 2nd most frequent category of 5 year fixed rate mortgages yields the same conclusions as detailed in Section 
4.5. 
8
 We also run a difference in means test to check whether the LTV ratios of customers that banks and insurers send offers to change over time. 
We do not find a significant difference between both periods.  
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after it. Table 1 also displays a rise in offered interest rates over time. Both banks and insurance 
companies charge higher rates in later periods. Cross-sectionally, insurance companies generally 
seem to offer cheaper rates. 
Indeed, our sample’s raising interest rates in later periods reflect a general trend starting at the 
beginning of 2013. Figure 3 shows the average offered mortgage interest rate in the sample and 
contrasts it with the evolution of the Swiss 10 year swap rates and the Swiss 10 year government 
bond yield. In our analysis we account for this upward trend in interest rates by including the 
Swiss 10 year swap rate as a refinancing control variable and further add monthly time dummies 
to absorb any other general economic developments. 
 
To investigate how representative our sample is of the Swiss mortgage market overall, we can 
compare it to the data from the most recent report by the Swiss National Bank (see SNB, 2012), 
which contains information on the distribution of mortgage lending across cantons and across 
LTV buckets. Table 2 shows the comparison. Following the SNB statistics, we compute the share 
of all extended mortgages in Switzerland by locational canton of the real estate property in 
Column (1a) and sort the cantons by rank order of the entire Swiss market. Column (2a) gives the 
share of requested mortgage volumes by locational canton and Column (2b) gives the share’s 
rank according to our sample. The last two columns replicate the share and its rank in our sample 
but draw on the un-weighted average of requests instead of weighting by requested mortgage 
amounts as in previous columns. Overall, the canton of Zurich ranks first, followed in both 
samples by Berne, Aargau and Vaud. For this reason, we conclude that our sample adequately 
represents the Swiss mortgage market in terms of geographical distribution of mortgages.  
To assess whether our sample is also representative in terms of customer risk characteristics, 
we construct three categories of loan to value (LTV buckets) given in the SNB statistics. In the 
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entire Swiss mortgage market, about 92.4% of all issued mortgages fall into the lowest LTV 
bucket below 67%. This compares well with our sample, in which 91% of all requested 
mortgages fall into this bucket. As to more risky mortgages in the medium category of LTV 
ratios above 67% but below 80%, data on the entire Swiss market say that 5.7% populate this 
bucket. In our sample, 8.2% of all mortgages populate that medium bucket. The top bucket 
ranges from LTVs above 80% to 100% and is filled by 1.9% of the entire Swiss market, whereas 
only 0.8% of our sample fill this bucket. These small differences between both samples in the 
most risky buckets derive from the fact, that the entire Swiss sample considers all issued 
mortgages over the past years. By contrast, our sample focuses on mortgage requests submitted 
after July 2012 when stricter rules on LTV ratios above 80% and tighter rules on household 
equity became effective. 
We infer from these figures, that our sample’s composition in terms of charged interest rates, 
borrower characteristics and geographical distribution proves relatively stable and representative.  
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4  Empirical Analysis  
This section presents both our empirical approach and our results, structured by three questions of 
interest. After presenting a decomposition of mortgage interest rates as a conceptual basis in 
Subsection 4.1, we analyze whether specific balance-sheet characteristics render a bank more 
sensitive to the CCB’s regulatory design in Subsection 4.2. To assess the effectiveness of risk-
weighting schemes that might amplify the CCB’s effects we provide a detailed analysis in 
Subsection 4.3. Then, Subsection 4.4 compares the responses of respectively banks and insurers 
and Subsection 4.5 summarizes our robustness checks.  
 
4.1  Decomposing the Mortgage Interest Rate 
To structure our ideas about how the additional capital requirements imposed by the CCB affect 
mortgage lending rates, we resort to the interest rate decomposition used in Button et al. (2010) 
tailored to our mortgage setup in Equation (1). 
 
jtijtjtijt residualriskcreditcostfundingrate ++=       (1) 
 
The rate offered by bank j to customer i comprises the funding cost of bank j at point in time t, 
the credit risk that bank j associates with the riskiness of the borrower i and a residual. We follow 
Button et al. (2010) and ascribe funding cost to external funding which should remain unaffected 
by the CCB. The credit risk features two cost components: first, the cost of the expected loss (EL) 
linked to the new loan and second the cost of holding equity capital that absorbs the unexpected 
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losses linked to the new loan. To compute the cost of the expected loss, Button et al. (2010) 
define the loss given default (LGD) as an increasing function of the LTV ratio. To compute the 
cost of holding equity capital, Button et al. (2010) refer to regulatory capital requirements. At this 
point, the CCB’s higher capital requirements come into play such that extra equity capital worth 
1% of risk-weighted mortgages translates into higher cost of equity capital in Equation (1). As 
the average risk weight increases with higher LTV ratios, risk-weighting schemes might amplify 
the CCB effect. Subsection 4.3 elaborates on this mechanism of LTV threshold effects. The 
residual in Equation (1) captures bank j’s operating costs as well as a targeted mark-up over 
marginal costs. The CCB requires banks to hold extra equity capital worth 1% of all previously 
issued, risk-weighted mortgages on its balance sheet. However, these mortgage contracts have 
been contracted in the past. Hence, the CCB ceteris paribus squeezes mark-ups, especially for 
banks with a mortgage-concentrated asset portfolio. In parallel with Button et al. (2010), we call 
this a “back-book” effect as the CCB lowers the return on existing assets. In an attempt to restore 
its mark-up, a bank can raise its mortgage interest rate. Section 4.2 features a bank’s degree of 
business specialization in mortgage lending as one sensitivity measure that interacts with the 
CCB’s effect and thus drives the mortgage rate. Further, banks might also increase their mortgage 
rates to rebuild their profit margins to compensate for the current environment of scarce 
profitable investment opportunities. Finally, a bank might expect further increases of the CCB’s 
requirements. It might then feel inclined to build up additional capital by boosting current profits 
and retain more of these earnings. 
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4.2 Sensitivity Measures linked to a Bank’s Balance Sheet Characteristics  
In this subsection, we restrict our focus to banks and zoom in on how balance sheet 
characteristics drive their individual pricing of mortgages. We can thereby analyze whether 
certain balance sheet characteristics render a bank particularly sensitive to the CCB’s regulatory 
design. To tackle potential endogeneity concerns, we exploit bank-level data from public annual 
reports lagged by one year, i.e. of the years 2011 and 2012.  
Our sensitivity indicator assigns banks to two groups depending on whether a bank’s sensitivity 
level as indicated by the past year’s balance sheet lies below or above the median of all 
participating banks in that current year. The sensitivity indicator itself enters our estimations and 
we further interact it with a CCB activation indicator to investigate to what extent the sensitivity 
measures reinforce the CCB effect. 
4.2.1 Definition of Sensitivity Measures 
Excess Capitalization as a Measure of Being Capital Constrained 
Here we distinguish between constrained and unconstrained banks, where the former are 
defined as banks whose excess capitalization was below the median excess capitalization of all 
participating banks. Banks must ensure not only that they remain solvent, but also that they do 
not violate regulatory capital requirements, because violations will trigger regulatory action and 
having to raise additional equity at short notice can be very expensive. On these grounds, we 
follow Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004 and 2014) in focusing on “excess capitalization” defined 
as actual capitalization minus regulatory requirements relative to the regulatory requirements. As 
explained in Jans and Passardi (2013), the supervisor FINMA has assigned Swiss banks to five 
target and intervention threshold groups depending inter alia on their balance sheet size. Hence, 
two banks with the same equity ratio may have different levels of excess capitalization if FINMA 
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has put them into different groups with different regulatory equity capital requirements. We 
proxy excess capitalization as the percentage deviation of the equity ratio from this regulatory 
intervention threshold. In their quantitative impact study, Cournède and Slovik (2011) state that 
for banks maintaining a discretionary capital buffer, the impact of higher capital requirements on 
lending spreads might be lower. Based on empirical evidence, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) 
find that banks with higher excess capitalization shield their customers during financial crises. 
This is because banks with comfortable excess capitalization have more degrees of freedom. 
They can still freely conduct their mortgage business and do not need to worry about violating 
the regulatory intervention threshold. Yet, banks which are close to the intervention threshold 
calibrate the mortgage rate to the tradeoff between approaching the threshold and reaping 
additional profits. We therefore anticipate that banks with little excess capitalization deemed 
constrained in our framework on average charge higher rates. When the CCB was activated, 
these banks became even more constrained charging even higher rates as a compensation for 
granting a mortgage. 
Specialization and Business Focus 
Mortgage-focused banks, defined as banks whose ratio of mortgages to equity capital lies 
above the median of all banks, might be more sensitive to the CCB’s particular design in 
Switzerland. In general, we put forward that banks with a higher share of mortgages on their 
balance sheets benefit from specialization in the mortgage business. These banks can pass their 
gains from economies of scale on to their customers by charging lower mortgage rates. 
Furthermore, against the background on relationship lending, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) 
find that banks with a business focus on retail lending protect their corporate customers during 
financial crises. However, the CCB as designed in the Swiss context applies exclusively to 
residential mortgage lending while sparing other bank businesses. As it applies to all residential 
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mortgages on balance sheets, the CCB bites even more into the equity of banks reporting a high 
share of mortgages in their asset portfolio. Yet, the rates on mortgage contracts concluded in the 
past cannot easily be adjusted to the CCB’s increased capital requirements. For this reason, we 
expect that banks with a very mortgage intensive portfolio per unit of equity and a business focus 
on mortgage lending respond more strongly to the CCB’s activation. 
Capitalization 
Capitalization considers whether a bank is better capitalized than the median of all banks in 
terms of its equity capital to total assets (Equity Capital/TA) ratio. We further decompose the 
capitalization measure into indicators of whether the corporate capital ratio (Corporate 
Capital/TA) and the capital reserves ratio (Capital Reserves/TA) exceed the median of all banks. 
This measure complements the previously presented Constrained indicator, and our argument 
runs in parallel. Banks with low capital ratios should be willing to expand their mortgage lending 
only in return for higher mortgage rates. 
The expenses or figurative price of raising different kinds of equity capital motivates our 
distinction between corporate capital and capital reserves. Banks might find it easier to increase 
their equity capital by retaining more of their earnings instead of annoying shareholders by 
diluting the value of their shares upon issuing new corporate capital. For this reason we 
hypothesize that banks which have relatively more corporate capital as opposed to retained 
earnings might feel pressured to generate higher profits to cater to their shareholders and thus 
charge higher rates. As the CCB imposes even higher capital requirements, we assume that the 
CCB reinforces this mechanism. 
Equity Capital and Mortgage Growth Rates 
To analyze how banks that have preemptively strengthened their capital base or cut mortgage 
growth respond to the CCB, we use indicators of whether the growth rates of equity capital 
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(∆Equity Capital) and mortgages (∆Mortgages) lie above the median among all offering banks in 
our sample. We assume that banks which have recently increased their CET1 capital feel 
relatively freer to follow a profit maximizing strategy. Expected effects depend on how profitable 
banks deem the mortgage business. After the CCB shock, banks which have recently increased 
their equity ratio should be able to cushion the extra equity levy on mortgages. By contrast, banks 
which have recently experienced substantial mortgage growth might follow a strategy to expand 
their market share. For this reason we expect these banks to offer cheaper mortgage rates to their 
customers before the CCB’s activation. As the CCB’s regulatory design exercises a stronger 
effect on banks with a lot of mortgages on their balance sheets, one might expect that these banks 
might revise their strategy and increase mortgage rates relative to the pre CCB period. 
Retail Banks 
In an attempt to proxy the business model of retail banking, we resort to the ratio of customer 
funds to mortgages (Customer Funds/Mortgages) and construct an above median indicator on 
whether the banks funding of mortgages is higher than the median among all banks. We 
hypothesize that banks in the retail business have more local expertise and can thus charge lower 
rates in general. As taking deposits usually goes hand in hand with mortgage lending, these banks 
are usually highly exposed to the mortgage market and thus carry a lot of mortgages on their 
balance sheets. We thus assume that these banks raise their mortgage rates after the CCB’s 
activation to pass on the additional costs to their customers, 
Return on Equity 
Finally, we study the return on equity (ROE) which has a twofold interpretation. On the one 
hand, it should proxy for a bank’s profitability, on the other hand it might proxy for the cost of 
equity capital. We hypothesize that profitable banks also have more degrees of freedom to act 
and exhibit lower sensitivity to the CCB effects. Jiménez et al. (2012) find a positive effect of 
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bank profitability on interest rates which might stem from the fact that more profitable banks 
charge higher rates as they can select among borrowers and are not forced into less profitable 
deals. Yet, ROE also serves as cost of equity proxy. If the Modigliani-Miller Theorem (1958) 
holds and the marginal cost of capital equals the marginal cost of debt finance, then a change in 
the equity-debt finance structure imposed by regulation should not affect banks’ total refinancing 
cost and should hence not affect their mortgage pricing. If by contrast equity finance is more 
expensive than debt finance, as contended by many bankers, then an imposed increase in the 
equity finance share should increase banks’ funding costs and, to the extent to which this is 
passed on, lead to higher mortgage rates. Banks with high costs of equity funding should be more 
reluctant to make mortgages. In particular, banks whose cost of equity finance exceeds the 
median of all banks should be more restrictive as mortgage lending requires banks to hold 
relatively more equity relative to other asset categories. As the CCB affects the equity capital 
requirements, we assume that banks with higher or relatively higher equity funding costs demand 
extra compensation by charging relatively higher mortgage rates. 
4.2.1 Estimation Approach 
Equation (2) describes our estimation procedure with the tranche-weighted mortgage rate 
ijtrate  offered by bank j to requesting customer i at point in time t as left-hand side variable. 
ijtjixjtxj
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To study the general impact and particular effects that unfold after the CCB shock materializes, 
we let the bank-level sensitivity indicator xjsens 201,  and its interaction with the CCB shock 
dummy tccb  enter our estimation. These time-varying sensitivity measures originate from the 
respective bank’s annual public report of the previous year, i.e. of 2011 or 2012. To absorb 
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customer characteristics including its financial situation, mortgage risk, location related effects 
and the real estate property type, we add request fixed effects ( )irequestFE _  to our 
specification. This allows us to zoom into the within request variation and to compare the pricing 
of different sets of banks. To absorb time-invariant heterogeneity among lenders, we also add 
lender fixed effects9. We compute heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, but do not cluster 
them by bank as the number of clusters would be too low and as cluster size differs considerably 
across lenders.  
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows our descriptive statistics on the sample of bank offers only. In the upper panel, it 
gives customer characteristics of the requests to which banks respond with an offer. The mean 
offered mortgage rate amounts to 208 bp and the mean indicated LTV ratio by the customer lies 
at 65%. One caveat applies to the first panel: the indicated request characteristics are by 
construction of our sample artificially inflated as this sample draws on multiple offers per 
individual request. The second panel gives the bank sensitivity dummies, while the third panel 
refers to the underlying levels. To highlight some sensitivity measures, Table 3 indicates that 
banks report an excess capitalization of 40.58% above the regulatory capital coverage ratio. 
Banks further invest 974.40 CHF into mortgage lending per 1 CHF of equity. The equity capital 
ratio (un-weighted CET1 ratio) lies at 7.3% with the capital reserve ratio exceeding the corporate 
capital ratio. Equity has grown annually by on average 6.64% between 2010 and 2012, whereas 
mortgage volumes have grown by on average 8.6%. The average ROE lies at 4.69% which 
ensues from our sample of rather small banks, retail banks and cantonal banks.  
 
9
 We run two robustness checks for the sensitivity analysis which are exhibited in the Online Appendix. First, we drop the lender fixed effects 
in Table A, but our core results remain virtually unaffected. Second, we define the median indicator for the set of banks offering for each specific 
request instead of all participating banks in our sample. Again our results shown in Table B remain intact. 
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4.2.3 Results 
Table 4 displays our estimation results from a regression of the offered mortgage rate on the 
different sensitivity measures and their interactions with the CCB dummy (CCB) indicating that 
its tighter capital requirements enter into force. 
Different columns relate to the inclusion of a sensitivity dummy indicating whether the 
respective sensitivity measure lies above (or below in case of being Constrained) the median 
among all participating banks and the interaction of this sensitivity dummy with the CCB 
activation indicator. As evidenced by Table 4, most of our results broadly align with our 
expectations on sensitivity concepts, but some results related to capitalization establish a contrast.  
Excess Capitalization as a Measure of Being Capital Constrained 
Results in Column (3) point out that capital-constrained banks charge on average 6.3 bp more 
after the CCB’s regulatory shock to capital requirements. This positive estimate on the interaction 
term reflects that banks which are close to the intervention threshold become even more 
constrained once the CCB is activated. Indeed, the CCB raises the intervention threshold while 
squeezing excess capitalization. Banks now charge an even higher mortgage rate that reflects 
their tradeoff between approaching the now even closer threshold and forgoing additional profits. 
The simple Constrained indicator is insignificant. Apparently before the CCB’s activation, banks 
that are closer to the intervention threshold still enjoy sufficiently many degrees of freedom to 
make mortgages whose pricing does not reflect their low excess capitalization. 
Specialization and Business Focus 
Results on the ratio of Mortgages/Equity Capital in Column (2) reveal that banks that 
specialize in the mortgage business submit offers which are on average 7.7 bp cheaper than those 
of their competitors. After the CCB activation, however, these banks increase their mortgage 
rates by on average 6.5 bp. The higher capital requirements force banks to hold more equity 
26 
capital for each mortgage unit already on their balance sheets. Some of that additional cost on 
their existing portfolio is hence passed on to new customers. 
We highlight these results on constrained and mortgage specialized banks as the first core 
finding of our paper which matches common expectations in that the CCB's design rationalizes 
this outcome. 
Capitalization 
Results in Columns (3) to (5) show that well capitalized banks charge on average lower rates 
after the CCB activation but the equity capital’s split into corporate capital and capital reserves 
reveals that capital reserves drive this finding. Banks with Equity Capital/TA above the median 
charge on average 8.9 bp less than their competitors after higher capital requirements come into 
force. Interestingly, our estimate on the CCB’s interaction with corporate capital points into the 
opposite direction. Banks with above median Corporate Capital/TA, charge almost 5 bp less 
before the CCB’s activation, but 8.3 bp more after it. Our estimate on the CCB’s interaction with 
capital reserves matches the result on the equity capital composite. Banks with above median 
Capital Reserves/TA charge 8.7 bp less after the CCB became effective. One might interpret this 
in light of the efforts or the figurative price associated with holding or raising both types of equity 
capital. Banks might face less opposition from existing shareholders when strengthening their 
capital base by retained earnings than by diluting the value of their shares by issuing new 
corporate capital. Further, a higher share of corporate capital means that shareholders demand 
relatively more compensation, whereas capital reserves do not. For this reason banks that report 
higher levels of corporate capital might feel under pressure to generate higher profits after the 
CCB’s activation by charging higher mortgage rates to pay higher dividends. One of our 
robustness checks incorporates the equity capital ratio and its components instead of the median 
indicators, but comes to the same conclusions. 
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Equity Capital and Mortgage Growth Rates 
Columns (6) and (7) examine the growth rates of equity and mortgages. The negative 
coefficient on ∆Equity Capital shows that banks which have strengthened their equity capital 
more than below median competitors generally charge 4.8 bp less. One might think of these 
banks as disposing of more “free capital” to seize investment opportunities. The CCB’s activation 
now utilizes some of these degrees of freedom which might explain the positive and significant 
interaction terms. In other words, banks that have recently strengthened their equity capital 
become more reluctant to make mortgages after the CCB by charging on average 2.6 bp more. 
Public annual reports show that most of the banks in our sample have increased their equity 
capital by retained earnings while only some banks have issued more corporate capital.  
The negative but significant coefficient on ∆Mortgages in Column (7) reveals that banks 
exhibiting above median growth rates of mortgages entering their balance sheet are cheaper. Yet, 
the interaction with the CCB is insignificant. For this reason we infer that banks seeking to 
expand their market shares do so by submitting cheaper offers and continue to do so after the 
CCB imposes stricter capital requirements. Apparently, the banks with high recent mortgage 
growth rates are not necessarily the same as those with already very mortgage intensive balance 
sheets. 
Retail Banks 
Column (8) relates to how banks refinance their mortgage issuance. Our results on Customer 
Funds/ Mortgages point out that banks which refinance relatively more mortgages through 
customer funds charge on average 22.3 bp less than their competitors with below median 
refinancing ratios. We attribute this finding to retail banks feeling more confident in the mortgage 
business with a lot of expertise on the local market. The interaction with the CCB turns out to be 
insignificant. Apparently these specialized banks continue making good offers also after the CCB 
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activation. This finding complements our previous result on ∆Mortgages and Mortgages/Equity 
Capital. We infer that banks with a standard retail business model based on deposits and 
mortgages submit in general cheaper offers. After the CCB, however, banks pass on higher costs 
ensuing from their balance sheet burden of mortgages to customers. Whether or not these banks 
have recently expanded their mortgage portfolio and the refinancing of these mortgages does not 
shape their response to tighter capital requirements. 
Return on Equity 
The estimate on the interaction of ROE and the CCB in column (9) carries a negative 
coefficient while the ROE coefficient itself is insignificant. In light of this result, we prefer to 
interpret ROE as a profitability measure rather than as a measure of equity cost. Thus, more 
profitable banks charge less after the CCB imposes stricter capital requirements. This finding fits 
with our results on Capital Reserves/TA as higher retained profits feed into capital reserves. 
Jointly considered, we conclude that very profitable banks that build up equity capital through 
retained earnings do not curb their lending after the CCB but offer cheaper rates instead. A 
robustness check using the return on assets (ROA) instead of ROE draws the same inferences. 
To sum up, we find that capital-constrained banks and banks which carry a lot of mortgages on 
their balance sheet pass the costs of higher capital requirements on to their customers. By 
contrast, very profitable banks or banks with substantial shares of retained earnings as equity 
capital lower their rates and continue mortgage issuance independently from their recent 
mortgage growth and their refinancing model. 
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4.3  Do LTV Threshold Effects amplify the CCB effect? 
This subsection unfolds the request-level dimension to study whether LTV thresholds that are 
associated with risk-weighting schemes of a bank’s assets amplify the effect of tighter capital 
requirements imposed by the CCB. 
The CCB shock increases a bank’s equity requirements per unit of risk-weighted mortgage 
lending. This design applies to all mortgages issued in the past that form part of a bank’s balance 
sheet and it applies to all new mortgages that a bank intends to make. Facing new mortgage 
demand, banks that are close to or below the regulatory equity requirement, can either raise their 
equity or restrict mortgage lending. In the latter case they can either reject more customers or 
demand higher rates. As the bank-specific CCB effect ensues from its composite of risk-weighted 
residential mortgages, the distinct LTV ratios of individual mortgages on bank balance sheets 
matter.  
Figure 4 illustrates how risk-weighting schemes translate the individual customer’s loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratios into capital requirements for the offering bank and thereby link the riskiness of the 
mortgage to the capitalization of a bank. The tranche of a mortgage above a customer’s LTV ratio 
of two-thirds (66%) receives a risk weight of 75%, while the mortgage tranche with LTV ratios 
below two thirds receive a risk weight of just 35% (see FINMA, 2013a). The top tranche above 
the LTV ratio of 80% receives a risk weight of 100%. Therefore, one may expect banks to pay 
special attention to the LTV ratios of new customers. 
4.3.1 Estimation Approach 
Equation (3) describes our regression specification that we run on our sample of banks. 
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We regress the tranche-weighted mortgage rate ijtrate  offered by bank j to requesting customer i 
at point in time t on the customer-specific LTV ratio, two dummies ltv67 and ltv80 indicating 
whether this LTV ratio equals or exceeds respectively 67% or 80%, as well as the interactions of 
these dummies with CCB activation indicator. To control for aggregate supply effects such as 
refinancing conditions, we include the Swiss 10-year swap rate ( refin ). To control for the 
individual traits of non-repeated requests, we add individual customer characteristics such as 
income, wealth, an indicator of other debt and age. We further again include lender fixed effects. 
And, to control for aggregate demand effects across individual requests, we add month10, 
property type and domiciled canton fixed effects. Standard errors are robust for the same reasons 
as previously specified. 
Due to the higher risk as well as higher risk weights, we anticipate that generally banks put an 
extra levy on LTV ratios above 66% ( 0,0 2322 >> ββ ). After the activation of the CCB, very high 
LTV mortgages bite even more into the equity capital. We hence assume that banks charge 
higher mortgage rates after the CCB shock, as they require extra compensation for the additional 
equity capital that they have to hold ( 0,0 2524 >> ββ ) for the bank sample. If however these 
threshold LTV ratios merely reflect a risk premium instead of the risk-weighting schemes, the 
amplification effect of 24β and 25β  is probably muted. 
4.3.2 Results 
Table 5 presents our results on banks. It points out that LTV per se is insignificant, but banks 
charge on average more than 2 bp extra on the entire mortgage for LTV ratios exceeding 67% 
and on top of that another 1.5 to 1.8 bp on LTV ratios exceeding 80%. However both interactions 
of the CCB with the high LTV dummies turn out to be insignificant. Thus the risk-weighting 
 
10
 We use monthly time fixed effects while splitting the event month February 2013 into two parts. 
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scheme does not amplify the CCB effect. We stress this as the second core finding of our paper. 
One likely reason for this result is the fact that escalating risk weights apply only to the mortgage 
tranche in excess of the 66% or 80% LTV threshold and not to the entire mortgage. Our 
alternative hypothesis suggests that LTV threshold indictors just signal very risky mortgages 
inducing lenders to charge a risk premium. In that case, risk-weighting schemes might indeed 
prove to be ineffective when capital requirements on behalf of the bank become stricter but 
lending standards with respect to the customer characteristics remain.  
We briefly discuss our results on control variables to assess whether our regression 
specification yields reasonable results. The estimated coefficient on the swap rate states that a 
100 bp increase in the swap rate translates into an increase of the average mortgage rate of about 
74 bp. A hint at the fact that many of our participating banks substantially draw on retail instead 
of wholesale funding can rationalize this number. We further find that a 100 bp increase in the 
specified income or wealth (entering our regression in logs) of the customers reduces her 
mortgage rate by on average 3 or 0.8 bp, respectively. Coefficients on the indicator of other 
private debt or the customer’s age do not yield significant estimates. This leads us to use the 
regression specification of column (3) as our preferred set of control variables which incorporates 
income and wealth but ignores insignificant customer characteristics. 
We conclude from this experiment that LTV thresholds most likely signal very risky mortgages 
which induce banks to charge a risk premium. Indeed, LTV thresholds do not amplify the CCB 
effects for banks which hints at the weak nexus between risk-weighting schemes and capital 
requirements as commonly applied in the framework of Basel III. 
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4.4  Banks and Insurers as Competitors on the Mortgage Market  
Two different types of mortgage lenders provide their services on the Comparis mortgage 
platform: banks and insurers. As insurers are exempt from the regulatory framework of Basel III, 
the CCB applies exclusively to banks, but not insurers. However, the CCB might affect insurers 
indirectly, as the CCB changes the costs of their competitors. If insurers expect this to lead to 
higher prices on the bank side, they may see this as an opportunity either to underbid banks and 
hence increase their market shares (“policy leakage”) or to also raise prices and thereby to 
increase their profits per unit of mortgage lending. After three simple comparison of mean tests in 
Table 7 a to c, we run regressions including both types of lenders to compare the lending 
behavior of banks and insurers before and after the CCB’s stricter capital requirements became 
effective in Table 7 d. 
Acceptance Rates 
Table 7 a compares the acceptance rates of banks and insurers before and after the CCB’s 
activation. Its last column shows that banks are more likely to respond with an offer in both 
periods and this difference in acceptance rates does not significantly change over time. Its last 
row states that, if anything, banks and insurers become slightly more likely to submit offers after 
the CCB was activated. We infer from this comparison of means that any CCB on the willingness 
to make loans operates through pricing rather than through the propensity to offer.  
That said, we can analyze the pricing of offers without having to worry that offers may be 
selective. This focus on loan pricing as opposed to the decision whether or not to make an offer 
also aligns with the arguments of Hanson et al. (2011) and the literature based on quantitative 
impact studies (see for instance Elliott, 2009, Cosimano and Hakura, 2011 or Cournède and 
Slovik, 2011).  
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For this reason, we resort to standard regressions below, using the mortgage rate as 
independent variable instead of further investigating the approval rates of lenders. 
Changes in the composition of demand? 
One might object however that the CCB implicitly alters mortgage demand and its 
composition. In this sense, households might anticipate that banks become more reluctant to lend 
and shy making very risky mortgages. To address this concern, we refer again to Table 1. It 
shows that despite the lower number of requests during the CCB=1 period, the average 
applicant’s LTV has not changed much. This runs counter to households fearing to be declined 
for requesting high LTV ratios. To further check whether changes in the composition of mortgage 
demand do not distort our results, we run a difference in means test on the LTV ratios requested 
by the customers. Results in Table 7 c show that these LTV ratios do not change over time and 
there is no significant difference between banks and insurers as to which LTV ratios they reject. 
We first conclude that banks and insurers do not exhibit different preferences for LTV ratios in 
terms of their willingness to lend. Later, however, we will show that they price the very risky 
mortgages differently.  
Mortgage Rates 
Table 7 b compares the offered mortgage interest rates of banks and insurers before and after 
the CCB activation. The last column points out that banks charge higher mortgage rates in both 
periods with no significant change in this difference over time. The last row of Table 7 b states 
that banks and insurers have significantly raised their mortgage rates by on average 30 bp after 
the CCB came into force. Two caveats are in order. First, this plain comparison of means does 
neither control for individual customer characteristics and the associated riskiness of a mortgage, 
nor does it control for changes in the aggregate interest rate level or any concomitant 
macroeconomic development. It simply motivates our baseline specification including individual 
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mortgage characteristics and customer controls on the individual level as well as including a 
refinancing control variable and a host of fixed effects to absorb potentially common driving 
factors.  
4.4.1 Estimation Approach 
In order to test for the differences in mortgage pricing of banks and insurers after the CCB’s 
activation we run the following regression. 
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Equation (4) now specifies our estimation equation while referring to the full sample of banks 
and insurers. This time, we regress the tranche-weighted offered mortgage rate ijtrate  on an 
indicator whether the offering lender j is a bank ( )jbank  or an insurer ( )jnonb  interacted with the 
CCB indicator. We further control for aggregate refinancing conditions, mortgage and customer 
characteristics as well as a host of monthly time, lender, property type and locational canton fixed 
effects. The interactions here capture the price increase after the CCB was activated, whereas the 
general price increase was entirely absorbed by time fixed effects in the previous estimation 
equations. 
It is important to recall that insurers are exempt from the CCB and any Basel III regulation. 
Instead they must follow their own regulation as specified in FINMA (2013b). This regulation 
states that -- as long as the portion above an LTV ratio of two-thirds is being amortized, the same 
requirement that became obligatory for banks in July 2012 – any mortgage lending until an LTV 
of 80% can be fully counted for tied computing tied assets. Hence for insurers we would not 
expect the same discontinuity in costs at the two-thirds LTV as for banks, but we would expect a 
discontinuity at the 80% LTV. However, as these rules do not change during our sample, it is 
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important to control for these LTV effects, we can draw a comparison between banks and 
insurers with respect to the CCB. 
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 repeats mortgage demand statistics. The first panel refers to the full sample, the second 
panel isolates banks and the third panel isolates insurers. As the observational unit is the offer and 
Table 6 features statistics based on multiple offers per individual requests, descriptive statistics 
are inflated by the number of offers per request. For this reason, we abstain from presenting 
further details as Table 2 gives un-weighted and more informative details differentiated by banks 
and insurers. 
4.4.3 Results 
Table 7 d shows our results on the joint sample of banks and insurers. We sequentially add 
mortgage characteristics and request controls while the main focus lays on the interaction of the 
CCB dummy with an indicator of whether the offering lender is a bank (BANK) or an insurer 
(NONB). This procedure has two advantages. First, we can individually test whether banks 
and/or insurers have raised or cut their mortgage rates after the CCB’s stricter capital requirement 
for banks came into force. Second, we can run a Wald test as displayed in the last two lines to 
find out whether the difference between banks and insurers after the CCB activation is 
significant. We borrow this procedure from Puri et al. (2011) in order to simultaneously include 
lender and monthly time fixed effects. To control for aggregate demand effects, we include a full 
set of fixed effects referring to the underlying real estate type and its domiciled canton, using 
robust standard errors for the previously cited reasons.  
Table 7 d accommodates our previous findings that banks and insurers charge higher mortgage 
rates after the CCB's activation. Banks charge on average 17-18 bp more while insurers charge on 
average 26-28 bp more. The last two lines exhibit our result that insurers have raised rates by on 
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average 8.8 bp more than banks. We highlight this finding as the third core result of our paper. 
One might as well have expected no impact on the insurers (given no direct CCB applicability) or 
even an attempt to underbid banks (given the existing literature on leakage). Indeed, after the 
activation many banks and newspapers complained publicly that the CCB would disadvantage 
them vis-à-vis insurers. 11 
This finding that banks add less to the CCB`s surcharge relative to insurers survives the 
inclusion of mortgage characteristics with threshold LTV effects as well as control variables on 
the individual request level. Column (4) displays our preferred specification to contrast the 
responses of banks and insurers, controlling for an extensive set of request and mortgage 
characteristics. As opposed to that, Column (7) distinguishes between different banking groups 
but abstains from running multiple Wald tests. We find that cantonal banks 
(KANTONALBANK; plus 14 bp), most of which are endowed with an explicit government 
guarantee, raise mortgage rates less than subsidiaries12 of foreign banks (FOREIGNBANK; plus 
19.5 bp) while other retail banks (OTHERBANK capturing for instance the banks owned by 
supermarket chains as well as very small savings banks or cooperatives, plus 20.7 bp) lead the 
price increase. These numbers align well with the estimated range of an 4.8 to 28 bp increase in 
lending rates as suggested by the literature on quantitative impact studies (see e.g. Elliott 2009, 
Cournède and Slovik 2011, Cosimano 2011).These quantitative impact studies however deal with 
simulations and balance sheet identities to gauge the impact of capital requirements more 
generally and not specifically with the CCB or the Swiss context. 
 
 
11
E.g. bank analysts predicted: „Now [insurers] have the potential to … increase their market share”. See Wacker (2013). 
12
 In Switzerland, the subsidiaries included in our sample are also subject to the CCB’s increased capital requirements. 
37 
Our results on banks and insurers however hint at an indirect effect. Insurers apparently expect 
banks as their competitors to pass on higher costs to their customer. A priori that leaves insurers 
two possible responses: Either to bid more aggressively for customers than banks and hence to 
increase their market share, or to bid less aggressively than banks in order to reap more profits. 
Our results provide tentative evidence that insurers opt for higher profits. The low interest rate 
environment and scarce profitable, but moderately risky investment prospects on financial 
markets might explain this finding. Insurers hence anticipate banks to raise offered mortgage 
rates after the CCB’s activation, but apparently insurers increase rates even stronger. In general 
our findings on insurers bear analogy to the results in Aiyar et al (2012). They show that in the 
UK higher capital requirements for UK banks have led to a response in the lending also by 
foreign banks who were not directly affected by the rate increase. The setting differs from ours in 
that the UK lenders who were not directly affected responded with a more aggressive market 
stance, i.e. they seized the opportunity to increase their market share. Such a response would have 
defeated a large part of the purpose of the CCB: It would still have improved the loss absorption 
capacity of banks, but would have increased the exposure of insurers without improving their loss 
absorption capacity, and might then have had no effect at all on equilibrium interest rates and 
mortgage volume growth. 
To summarize, our comparison of banks and insurers shows that both charge more after the 
CCB’s shock to capital requirements which actually only affect banks but not insurers. Indeed, 
banks contribute less to the surcharge after the CCB. 
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4.5  Robustness Checks  
To check the robustness of our results, we repeat the previous estimations with different 
subsamples and specifications.  
First, we restrict the estimation sample to a window covering only three months before and 
three months after the CCB activation. Our findings on sensitivity measures remain mainly 
unaffected except for two results. First, we find that banks that have recently increased their 
equity capital now cut their rates after the CCB. We interpret this as an effect of relief in the most 
recent period after the activation, which waters out once banks realize that the capital increase 
might not have been sufficient. Second, we find that banks with higher return on equity also raise 
their rates immediately after it. We interpret this as banks trying to maintain higher levels of 
profitability immediately after the shock. Either difference may reflect that over a number of 
months banks’ response to the CCB is likely to depend also on how their competitors turn out to 
respond and on how stable mortgage demand will develop turns out to be. 
Our findings on the ineffectiveness of risk-weighting schemes and LTV thresholds remain 
intact. When rerunning the comparison between banks and insurers on the shorter window and 
hence with significantly fewer observations, we cannot estimate all fixed effects included in our 
baseline regressions, so we focus on the simple comparison of means here. That suggests that 
both lenders raise mortgage rates after the CCB, and insurers seem to charge even more than 
banks.  
As an alternative control for the refinancing rate, we use the Swiss 10-year government bond 
rate instead of the Swiss 10-year swap rate. All findings remain almost entirely unaffected. 
Finally, using different sets of fixed effects and clustering does not harm our findings, either. 
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5  Conclusions 
This paper examines how Swiss lenders price mortgages before and after the activated 
Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer (CCB) imposes higher capital requirements on banks. Since 
Switzerland was the first country to activate the CCB as the macro-prudential policy tool of Basel 
III, this is, to the best of our knowledge, its first empirical evaluation. 
Our dataset on multiple independent offers per individual mortgage request allows us to 
separate mortgage demand and mortgage supply. To shed light on how a bank’s capitalization, 
business model, portfolio and funding structure shape its pricing before and after the shock to 
capital requirements, we add bank-level data from public annual reports. We further analyze 
critical loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, as risk-weighting schemes link the riskiness of individual 
borrowers to regulatory bank capital requirements. Indeed, these risk-weighting schemes may be 
expected to amplify the CCB effects. To put our results into perspective, we contrast banks that 
are subject to higher capital requirements with insurers that are exempt from it but compete with 
banks as suppliers in the Swiss mortgage market. This enables us to compare the responses of 
banks experiencing the capital requirement shock to the behavior of insurers beyond the realm of 
Basel III.  
Three core findings emerge. First, the CCB’s higher capital requirements significantly interact 
with bank sensitivity measures. Capital-constrained banks with little excess capitalization relative 
to the regulatory intervention threshold raise their rates relatively more after the CCB’s 
activation. This reflects a bank’s tradeoff between approaching the now even closer intervention 
threshold and reaping additional profits. Banks which are very specialized in mortgage lending 
do also increase their offered mortgage rates relatively more. Thus, as higher capital requirements 
apply both to new mortgages and to the stock of issued mortgages on balance sheets, banks seem 
to roll over the extra costs of previously issued mortgages to their new customers. 
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Our second finding relates to the pricing of very risky mortgages. Risk-weighting schemes put 
an extra equity levy in terms of equity capital requirements on very risky mortgages with LTV 
ratios above 66% and 80%. We find that banks generally charge more on very risk mortgages, 
but these risk-weighting schemes do not amplify the CCB effects. This suggests that the nexus 
between the customer’s leverage and regulatory risk weights may still be weaker than would be 
optimal. We provide two possible explanations for this finding. On the one hand, higher risk 
weights apply only to the tranche of lending above the respective LTV threshold rather than to 
the entire mortgage amount. This weakens the average risk-weight effect for the whole mortgage. 
On the other hand, we might interpret LTV thresholds as the signals for very risky mortgages 
inducing lenders to charge a risk premium. In this light, LTV thresholds linked to regulatory risk-
weighting schemes prove ineffective when interacted with the CCB’s shock to capital 
requirements. 
Third, both banks and insurers as their competitors increase their average mortgage rates after 
the CCB has been activated. Yet insurers raise rates by on average 8.8 bp more than banks 
despite being exempt from the CCB and any Basel III capital standards. Hence, policy leakage, in 
the sense of underbidding by insurers exempt from the CCB, does not seem to be an issue in the 
Swiss mortgage market. While a priori it was not clear whether banks’ higher costs and 
consequently higher mortgage rates would induce insurers to either expand their market shares or 
to expand of their profits per unit of mortgage lending, we provide evidence that insurers opt for 
higher profits. The low interest rate environment and scarce profitable, but moderately risky 
investment prospects might rationalize our finding. Against this background, we interpret the 
increase of insurers’ rates as an implicit side effect. This adds a very interesting twist to the 
discussion and literature on possible leakage of economic policy in general and macro-prudential 
policy in particular. It provides an example where actors not subjected to the policy themselves 
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are indeed affected indirectly through market forces, but in a direction different from what may 
have been expected. Such indirect effects can be a very important issue, so we expect our 
findings to constitute a starting point for further work to better understand such side effects. 
We conclude that lenders welcome the opportunity of this regulatory capital shock to increase 
mortgage prices, but higher capital standards do not discourage banks from offering very risky 
mortgages. 
 
Our paper informs the debate on macro- and micro-prudential regulation. We find that the CCB 
does not impinge on the willingness of banks to issue loans, only the pricing of mortgages shows 
significant effects. In terms of balance sheet characteristics, the CCB seems to exercise the 
incentive effects envisioned by the regulator. Yet, our study reveals that the CCB does not make 
lending to very risky customers more expensive. Regulators might have anticipated an increase of 
the extra levy on the most leveraged households, but our analysis demonstrates that risk-
weighting schemes seem to be ineffective in light of the higher capital requirements imposed by 
the CCB. Finally, our analysis has shown some side effects on insurers. These findings might 
invite regulators to pay special attention to the competitors of banks that are beyond the realm of 
capital standards as suggested by Basel III. 
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DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES  
Dependent Variable 
Offered Mortgage Rate Tranche-weighted offered mortgage interest rate measured in basis points 
and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 
Refinancing Control 
Swap Rate 10y 10 year Swiss interbank swap rate. 
 
Mortgage Characteristics 
LTV Loan to value ratio as specified by the customer. 
LTV67 Indicator of whether the LTV equals or exceeds the value of 67%. 
LTV80 Indicator of whether the LTV equals or exceeds the value of 80%. 
 
Bank Sensitivity Measures 
Excess Capitalization Excess capitalization is measured as the distance between the bank's 
capital coverage ratio and the target ratio relative to the target ratio. 
Constrained (0/1) Indicator equal to one if Excess Capitalization is below the median. 
Capital Coverage Ratio Actual Capitalization as defined in FINMA (2011). 
Mortgages/Equity Capital Ratio of mortgages to Equity Capital. Equity Capital is defined as CET1 
capital and can be decomposed into corporate capital and capital reserves.  
Mortgages/Equity Capital (0/1) Indicator equal to one if Mortgages/Equity Capital is above the median. 
∆Equity Capital Annual growth rate of Equity Capital.  
∆Equity Capital (0/1) Indicator equal to one if ∆Equity Capital is above the median. 
∆Mortgages  Annual growth rate of mortgage volume on a bank’s balance sheet. 
∆Mortgages (0/1)  Indicator equal to one if ∆Mortgages is above the median. 
Customer Funds The due to customers such as deposits as well as cash bonds. 
Customer Funds (0/1) Indicator equal to one if Customer Funds is above the median. 
ROE Return on equity. 
ROE (0/1) Indicator equal to one if ROE is above the median. 
 
Customer Controls 
Income Annual household income as specified by the customer expressed in ln. 
Wealth Wealth including retirement savings as specified by the customer 
expressed in ln. 
Debt Indicator of whether the customer reports any kind of debt. 
Age Age of the customer. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: Sample and Shock Periods 
 
 
Figure 2: Back of the Envelope Computation of a bank’s expected additional cost 
 
 
48 
Figure 3: Sample Averages of all 10 Year Offered Mortgage Rates, 10 Year Swiss Swap Rates and Government Bonds 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Comparis and authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 4: Mortgage Tranche and Mortgage Total Average Risk Weights as Functions of the Loan to Value (LTV) Ratio 
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Table 1: Mortgage Demand and Supply Participation 
CCB=0 CCB=1
Mortgage Demand
Number of Requests 661 516
Applicant's LTV 65.66 65.42
Mortgage Supply
Number of Answers all 3'873 2'461
by banks 2'744 1'865
by insurers 1'129 596
Number of Offers all 3'313 2'146
by banks 2'390 1'655
by insurers 923 491
Number of Rejections all 560 315
by banks 354 210
by insurers 206 105
Offered Mortgage Rate all 192.26 223.59
by banks 195.39 226.36
by insurers 184.18 214.24
Notes : This table presents our database in terms of mortgage
demand and supply participation. It focuses on requested 10-year
fixed rate mortgages only. The underlying average offered
mortgage interes t rates result from the tranche-weighted offered
mortgage interes t rates .
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Table 2: Our Sample and the Swiss Mortgage Market 
in % Rank in % Rank in % Rank
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Zurich 19.19 1 25.59 1 22.51 1
Berne 10.77 2 11.69 3 13.25 2
Aargau 8.73 3 10.26 4 11.47 3
Vaud 8.07 4 11.73 2 10.96 4
St.Gallen 5.73 5 4.61 5 5.52 5
Geneva 5.06 6 2.70 12 1.78 15
Ticino 4.73 7 2.52 13 2.21 13
Lucerne 4.64 8 4.42 6 4.33 6
Basel Land 3.86 9 2.94 9 2.80 10
Valais 3.59 10 1.77 15 2.29 12
Thurgau 3.48 11 3.81 7 3.91 7
Solothurn 3.37 12 2.93 10 3.31 9
Graubünden 3.33 13 1.56 17 1.87 14
Fribourg 3.23 14 3.13 8 3.82 8
Schwyz 2.37 15 2.74 11 2.46 11
Zug 2.04 16 1.82 14 1.27 17
Basel Stadt 1.92 17 1.64 16 1.53 16
Neuchatel 1.53 18 1.03 18 1.19 18
Schaffhausen 0.94 19 0.41 23 0.68 19
Jura 0.75 20 0.41 22 0.59 20
Appenzell AR 0.62 21 0.36 24 0.59 21
Nidwalden 0.54 22 0.61 20 0.42 23
Obwalden 0.47 23 0.75 19 0.59 22
Glarus 0.44 24 0.43 21 0.42 24
Uri 0.40 25 0.16 25 0.17 25
Appenzell IR 0.18 26 0.00 26 0.00 26
 Switzerland 2012: Share 
of Issued Mortgages
Locational 
Canton of the 
real estate 
property
Estimation Sample: 
Share of Requested 
Mortgage Volumes
Estimation Sample: 
Share of Requests
Notes: This table compares the entire Swiss mortgage market in Columns (1a) and (1b) with
our sample in Columns (2a) to (3b). We compute the share of all mortgages by locational
canton of the associated real estate property for the stock of all issued mortgages in Switzerland
in Column (1a). By analogy, Column (2a) gives the share of requested mortgage volumes by
locational canton and Column (3a) indicates the share of requests per locational canton while
giving equal weight to each request instead of weighting by mortgage volume. Source: SNB
(2012) and Comparis.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Offered Mortgage Rate Regressions including Sensitivity Measures with Banks only 
mean p50 sd min max N
1120 requests; 22 bank
offered mortgage rate (in bp) 208.08 201.20 24.68 159 277.5 4'045
Swap Rate 10y (in %) 1.09 1.03 0.21 0.82 1.70 4'045
CCB (0/1) 0.41 0.00 0.49 0 1 4'045
LTV (in%) 65.17 70.00 15.73 7 100 4'045
LTV67 (0/1) 0.56 1.00 0.50 0 1 4'045
LTV80 (0/1) 0.20 0.00 0.40 0 1 4'045
Income (in CHF tsd) 176.71 155.00 92.65 15.00 1400.00 4'045
Wealth (in CHF tsd) 521.40 313.00 967.57 5.00 20000.00 4'045
Income (ln) 11.98 11.95 0.44 9.62 14.15 4'045
Wealth (ln) 12.64 12.65 1.01 8.52 16.81 4'045
Debt (0/1) 0.16 0.00 0.37 0 1 4'045
Age 44.60 44.00 9.36 20 79 4'045
Bank Sensitivity (above/below median)
Constrained (0/1) 0.61 1 0.49 0 1 4'045
Mortgages/Equity Capital (0/1) 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 4'045
Equity Capital/TA (0/1) 0.34 0 0.47 0 1 4'045
Corporate Capital/TA (0/1) 0.56 1 0.50 0 1 4'045
Capital Reserves/TA (0/1) 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 4'045
∆Equity Capital (0/1) 0.60 1 0.49 0 1 4'045
∆Mortgages (0/1) 0.57 1 0.50 0 1 4'045
Customer Funds/Mortgages (0/1) 0.78 1 0.41 0 1 4'045
ROE (0/1) 0.61 1 0.49 0 1 4'045
Bank Sensitivity (levels)
Excess Capitalization (in %) 40.58 44.79 21.82 8.29 119.61 3'129
Mortgages/Equity Capital (in %) 974.40 902.60 220.30 379.73 1785.48 4'045
Equity Capital/TA (in %) 7.30 7.36 1.19 4.91 13.96 4'045
Corporate Capital/TA (in %) 1.59 1.28 1.13 0.00 3.72 4'045
Capital Reserves/TA (in %) 5.40 5.07 1.84 2.57 12.91 4'045
∆Equity Capital (in %) 6.64 4.39 11.75 0.17 146.48 4'045
∆Mortgages (in %) 8.59 8.35 7.33 1.57 94.42 4'045
Customer Funds/Mortgages (in %) 115.87 110.68 32.90 37.14 202.95 4'045
ROE (in %) 4.69 6.10 2.56 0.17 9.54 4'045
Notes : This table exhibi ts descriptive statistics of our regress ions with banks only. We express the dependent variable
offered mortgage interest rate in bas is points and winsorize i t a t the 1st and 99th percenti le. LTV67 [LTV80] stands for an
indicator of whether this LTV exceeds the value of 67 [80]. Al l Bank Sensi tivity measures (above/below median) in the
second panel feature (0/1) indicators of whether the bank is above the median among a l l participating banks in a given
year (except for Constrained which refers  to Excess  Capi ta l i zation being below the median). Al l  Bank Sens i tivi ty measures  
in the thi rd panel feature levels . Constra ined draws on excess capi ta l i za tion measured as the dis tance between the
bank's capi ta l coverage ratio and the target ratio relative to the target ratio. Mortgages/Equity Capita l refers to the ratio
of mortgages to equity capi ta l . Equi ty capi ta l i s defined as CET1 capita l and can be decomposed into corporate capi ta l
and capita l reserves . ∆Equity Capita l and ∆Mortgages represents the growth rates of Equity Capita l and the stock of
mortgages on balance sheets , respectively. Customer Funds capture the due to customers such as depos i ts as well as
cash bonds whi le ROE stands for the Return on Equity. Please refer to the Descriptions of Main Variables for more
detai l s .
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Table 4: Mortgage Rate Regression with Sensitivity Measures for Banks only 
Offered Mortgage Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sensitivity Measures
Constrained 6.8883
(5.9641)
CCB*Constrained 6.2789***
(0.9325)
Mortgages/Equity Capital -7.6884***
(0.8925)
CCB*Mortgages/Equity Capital 6.5307***
(0.9604)
Equity Capital/TA 1.0708
(3.4065)
CCB*Equity Capital/TA -8.8509***
(0.9922)
Corporate Capital/TA -4.9685**
(2.3202)
CCB*Corporate Capital/TA 8.3259***
(0.8766)
Capital Reserves/TA -11.5118
(12.4785)
CCB*Capital Reserves/TA -8.7294***
(0.9274)
∆Equity Capital -4.7533***
(0.7278)
CCB*∆Equity Capital 2.5683**
(1.2662)
∆Mortgages -2.2854***
(0.7056)
CCB*∆Mortgages 0.8470
(1.1763)
Customer Funds/Mortgages -22.3350**
(11.3287)
CCB*Customer Funds/Mortgages -0.1036
(1.1002)
ROE -1.1818
(2.0306)
CCB*ROE -1.8902**
(0.8741)
Constant 242.7159***246.7853***199.6107***242.9582***249.4647***200.9042***219.6279***252.3132***243.3556***
(7.3538) (6.1920) (6.5295) (5.3274) (3.5127) (6.2541) (5.4697) (4.0835) (5.8023)
Observations 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045
R-squared 0.8281 0.8297 0.8306 0.8305 0.8309 0.8277 0.8255 0.8248 0.8252
Notes: This table s hows the resul ts of an OLS regress ion with the offered mortgage rate. The offered mortgage rate is meas ured in bas is points and winsorized at
the 1s t and 99th percenti le. Al l bank sens i tivi ty meas ures feature a (0/1) indicator of whether the bank is above the median among al l participating banks in a
given year (except for Constra ined which refers to exces s capi ta l ization being below the median). Please refer to Table 3 and the Descriptions of Main Variables for
more deta i l s . Al l regress ions include fixed effects for each request and for each offering bank. Heteros kedastici ty consistent standard errors in parentheses with
***, ** and * denoting s igni ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level .
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Table 5: Mortgage Rate Regression with Threshold LTVs for Banks only 
Offered Mortgage Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mortgage Characteristics
LTV 0.0282 0.0261 0.0264 0.0267 0.0251
(0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0207)
LTV67 (0/1) 2.1329*** 2.5814*** 2.3856*** 2.3825*** 2.3527***
(0.6950) (0.6923) (0.6954) (0.6960) (0.6966)
LTV80 (0/1) 1.8084** 1.8488** 1.5700** 1.5591** 1.5391**
(0.7500) (0.7441) (0.7462) (0.7476) (0.7476)
CCB*LTV67 (0/1) -1.4976 -1.4916 -1.4856 -1.4931 -1.5161*
(0.9193) (0.9122) (0.9111) (0.9108) (0.9115)
CCB*LTV80 (0/1) 0.8679 1.3353 1.4530 1.4593 1.4828
(1.1688) (1.1508) (1.1509) (1.1516) (1.1516)
Refinancing Control
Swap Rate 10y 73.6928*** 75.1129*** 74.4085*** 74.3725*** 74.2675***
(4.6923) (4.6574) (4.6616) (4.6695) (4.6725)
Request Controls
Income -3.9127*** -3.1353*** -3.1514*** -3.2027***
(0.4673) (0.5086) (0.5114) (0.5191)
Wealth -0.8430*** -0.8406*** -0.8085***
(0.2241) (0.2240) (0.2278)
Debt (0/1) 0.1442 0.1768
(0.5425) (0.5434)
Age -0.0158
(0.0227)
Constant 120.4573*** 166.4232*** 168.8237*** 185.1407*** 186.3524***
(8.7060) (9.8368) (9.8425) (9.9337) (10.0654)
Observations 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045
R-squared 0.7593 0.7635 0.7643 0.7644 0.7644
Notes : Thi s table s hows the results of an OLS regres s ion with the offered mortgage rate
as left-hand s ide variable. The offered mortgage rate is meas ured in bas is points and
winsori zed at the 1st and 99th percenti le. LTV67 [LTV80] s tands for an indicator of
whether thi s LTV exceeds the va lue of 67 [80]. CCB*LTV67 [CCB*LTV80] refers to the
interaction of the CCB with the LTV67 [LTV80] variable. To control for the genera l level of
refinancing costs , we add the 10-year interes t swap rate. Please refer to Table 3 and
the Des criptions of Main Variables for more detai l s . Al l regres s ions include fixed
effects for the offering bank, the month of s ubmis s ion (whi le February 2013 is spl i t into
a pre and post February 2013 dummy), the request's property type and domici led
canton. Heteroskedasti ci ty cons i stent s tandard errors in parentheses wi th ***, ** and *
denoting s igni ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level .
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample as well as Banks and Insurers, separately 
mean p50 sd min max N
1129 requests; 22 banks and 3 insurers
offered mortgage rate (in bp) 204.62 200 25.09 159 277.5 5'459
CCB (0/1) 0.39 0 0.49 0 1 5'459
LTV (in%) 65.30 70 15.40 7 100 5'459
LTV67 (0/1) 0.56 1 0.50 0 1 5'459
LTV80 (0/1) 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 5'459
Income (in CHF ts d) 178.60 157.5 94.24 15 1'400 5'459
Wealth (in CHF tsd) 527.23 320 946.54 5 20'000 5'459
Income (ln) 11.99 11.97 0.44 9.62 14.15 5'459
Wealth (ln) 12.66 12.68 1.01 8.52 16.81 5'459
Debt (0/1) 0.17 0 0.37 0 1 5'459
Age 44.58 44 9.33 20 79 5'459
1126 requests; 22 banks
offered mortgage rate (in bp) 208.08 201.2 24.68 159 277.5 4'045
CCB (0/1) 0.41 0 0.49 0 1 4'045
LTV (in%) 65.17 70 15.73 7 100 4'045
LTV67 (0/1) 0.56 1 0.50 0 1 4'045
LTV80 (0/1) 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 4'045
Income (in CHF ts d) 176.70 155 92.66 15 1'400 4'045
Wealth (in CHF tsd) 521.40 313 967.57 5 20'000 4'045
Income (ln) 11.98 11.95 0.44 9.62 14.15 4'045
Wealth (ln) 12.64 12.65 1.01 8.52 16.81 4'045
Debt (0/1) 0.16 0 0.37 0 1 4'045
Age 44.60 44 9.36 20 79 4'045
851 requests;  3 insurers
offered mortgage rate (in bp) 194.71 191.17 23.59 159 277.5 1'414
CCB (0/1) 0.35 0 0.48 0 1 1'414
LTV (in%) 65.66 69 14.40 7 81 1'414
LTV67 (0/1) 0.55 1 0.50 0 1 1'414
LTV80 (0/1) 0.19 0 0.39 0 1 1'414
Income (in CHF ts d) 184.00 160 98.46 35 1400 1'414
Wealth (in CHF tsd) 543.89 335 883.74 5 20'000 1'414
Income (ln) 12.02 11.98 0.44 10.46 14.15 1'414
Wealth (ln) 12.71 12.72 1.01 8.52 16.81 1'414
Debt (0/1) 0.17 0 0.37 0 1 1'414
Age 44.51 43 9.24 24 79 1'414
Notes : This  table exhibi ts  descriptive statis ti cs  of our regres s ions  with banks  and insurers . We express  the dependent variable offered mortgage rate in 
bas is  points  and  winsorize i t a t the 1st and 99th percenti le. LTV67 [LTV80] s tands  for an indicator of whether thi s  LTV exceeds  the va lue of 67 [80]. Pl ease 
refer to the Des cri pti ons  of Main Variables  for more deta i ls .
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Table 7 a: Comparison of Means: Acceptance Rates 
OFFER(0/1)
Banks Insurers Difference
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
CCB=0 0.871*** 0.818*** 0.053***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
CCB=1 0.887*** 0.824*** 0.064***
(0.007) (0.016) (0.017)
Difference 0.016* 0.006 0.010
(0.010) (0.019) (0.022)
Notes : Thi s  table shows  comparis on of means es timates   of loan acceptance 
rates . Heteroskedasti ci ty cons i stent s tandard errors  in parenthes es  with ***, 
**, and * denoting s igni ficance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level .
 
 
Table 7 b: Comparison of Means: Offered Mortgage Rates 
Offered Mortgage Rate
Banks Insurers Difference
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
CCB=0 195.647*** 184.324*** 11.323***
(0.294) (0.538) (0.613)
CCB=1 226.033*** 214.274*** 11.786***
(0.624) (1.024) (1.200)
Difference 30.386*** 29.924*** 0.463
(0.690) (1.157) (1.347)
Notes : Thi s table s hows comparis on of means es timates of the CCB's effect on
the offered mortgage interest rate for res pectively banks and insurers . The
offered mortgage rate i s meas ured in bas is points and wins ori zed at the 1s t
and 99th percenti le. Robust standard errors in parentheses wi th ***, **, and *
denoting s igni ficance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level .
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Table 7 c: Comparison of Means: Requested LTV Ratios 
Requested LTV
Banks Insurers Difference
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
CCB=0 64.983*** 65.791*** -0.8080
(0.329) (0.473) (0.576)
CCB=1 65.451*** 65.418*** 0.0330
(0.374) (0.653) (0.752)
Difference 0.4670 -0.3730 0.8410
(0.498) (0.806) (0.947)
Notes : Thi s table s hows mean Difference-in-Difference (DID) es timates of the
loan-to-va lue (LTV) ratio as indicated in the cus tomer's request.
Heteros kedastici ty cons istent standard errors in parentheses wi th ***, **, and
* denoting s igni ficance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level .
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Table 7 d: Offered Mortgage Rate Regression Comparing Banks, Banking Groups and Insurers 
Offered Mortgage Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) CCB*BANK 18.1311*** 18.7369*** 18.0803*** 17.7655*** 17.8320*** 17.9357***
(2.9282) (2.9042) (2.8706) (2.8755) (2.8842) (2.8860)
(a) CCB*KANTONALBANK 14.0554***
(2.9824)
(a) CCB*FOREIGNBANK 19.5148***
(2.9216)
(a) CCB*OTHERBANK 20.6944***
(2.8853)
(b) CCB*NONB 26.9625*** 27.5509*** 26.8791*** 26.5553*** 26.6166*** 26.7209*** 26.8837***
(3.0176) (2.9943) (2.9620) (2.9652) (2.9725) (2.9763) (2.9617)
Refinancing Control
Swap Rate 10y 72.5580*** 71.9349*** 72.9096*** 71.9478*** 71.8929*** 71.8162*** 72.1620***
(4.1694) (4.1393) (4.1210) (4.1210) (4.1282) (4.1309) (4.0720)
Mortgage Characteristics
LTV 0.1600*** 0.0476*** 0.0458** 0.0459** 0.0463** 0.0449** 0.0449**
(0.0113) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0179)
3.1308*** 3.5347*** 3.2709*** 3.2630*** 3.2274*** 3.3118***
(0.5445) (0.5424) (0.5448) (0.5450) (0.5480) (0.5425)
LTV80 (0/1) 2.6726*** 2.9084*** 2.6146*** 2.6032*** 2.5909*** 2.6349***
(0.5138) (0.5082) (0.5103) (0.5108) (0.5111) (0.5081)
Request Controls
Income -3.4705*** -2.4471*** -2.4696*** -2.5118*** -2.4437***
(0.4118) (0.4494) (0.4530) (0.4586) (0.4494)
Wealth -1.0885*** -1.0860*** -1.0598*** -1.0799***
(0.1969) (0.1969) (0.2000) (0.1954)
Debt (0/1) 0.2066 0.2359
(0.4682) (0.4686)
Age -0.0136
(0.0199)
Constant 118.6651*** 122.6677*** 162.3979*** 165.5466*** 165.6442*** 166.5243*** 166.5272***
(12.3072) (12.5125) (13.5326) (13.5074) (13.4919) (13.5910) (14.0626)
Observations 5,459 5,459 5,459 5,459 5,459 5,459 5,459
R-squared 0.7602 0.7632 0.7664 0.7678 0.7678 0.7678 0.7702
DID estimate (a)-(b) -8.831 -8.814 -8.799 -8.790 -8.785 -8.785
Wald test (a)-(b) p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes : This table shows the results of an OLS regress ion with the offered mortgage rate as left-hand s ide variable. This offered
rate is measured in bas i s points and wins orized at the 1st and 99th percenti le. CCB*BANK [CCB*NONB] refers to the interaction
of the CCB with an indica tor BANK [NONB] of whether the offering insti tution is a bank [insurer]. KANTONALBANK, FOREIGNBANK
and OTHERBANK are dummy variables indi cating the banking group in which a bank can be cla ss i fied according to the standars
of the Swiss National Bank. To control for the general level of refinancing costs , we add the 10-year interest s wap rate. LTV67
[LTV80] stands for indica tor of whether this LTV exceeds the value of 67 [80]. The diagnostic section reports the DID estimate
and its p-va lue from the Wald test under the H0 that the di fference between banks and insurers equals zero. Al l regress ions
include fixed effects for the offering bank, the month of submiss ion (whi le February 2013 is spl i t into a pre and post February
2013 dummy), the request's property type and domici led ca nton. Heteroskedastici ty cons is tent standard errors in parentheses
with ***, ** and * denoti ng s igni ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level .
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
Table A: Mortgage Rate Regression with Sensitivity Measures for Banks only (dropping lender fixed effects) 
Offered Mortgage Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sensitivity Measures
Constrained -1.3034**
(0.5715)
CCB*Constrained 6.5410***
(1.0078)
Mortgages/Equity Capital -3.7413***
(0.5432)
CCB*Mortgages/Equity Capital 6.8657***
(0.9672)
Equity Capital/TA 1.8843***
(0.6325)
CCB*Equity Capital/TA -10.4998***
(1.0641)
Corporate Capital/TA -2.5858***
(0.5566)
CCB*Corporate Capital/TA 8.3608***
(0.9354)
Capital Reserves/TA 2.9878***
(0.6078)
CCB*Capital Reserves/TA -9.8486***
(1.0050)
∆Equity Capital -4.2074***
(0.5551)
CCB*∆Equity Capital -1.1350
(1.2034)
∆Mortgages 1.0233*
(0.5447)
CCB*∆Mortgages -5.9851***
(1.1462)
Customer Funds/Mortgages -2.6399***
(0.6578)
CCB*Customer Funds/Mortgages -1.8787
(1.1721)
ROE -2.4163***
(0.5184)
CCB*ROE -2.6871***
(0.9181)
Constant 188.8034***199.0756***223.1157***271.7250***222.0122***229.2074***223.9767***234.5185***227.4163***
(0.5715) (0.8003) (0.6325) (0.7518) (0.6078) (0.5551) (0.5447) (0.9701) (0.5184)
Observations 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045
R-squared 0.7990 0.7989 0.8050 0.8009 0.8031 0.8009 0.7975 0.7976 0.7995
Notes: This table s hows the resul ts of an OLS regress ion with the offered mortgage rate. The offered mortgage rate is meas ured in bas is points and winsorized at
the 1s t and 99th percenti le. Al l bank sens i tivi ty meas ures feature a (0/1) indicator of whether the bank is above the median among al l participating banks in a
given year (except for Constra ined which refers to exces s capi ta l ization being below the median). Please refer to Table 3 and the Descriptions of Main Variables for
more detai l s . Al l regres s ions include fixed effects for each request. Heteroskedastici ty consistent standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * denoting
s igni ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level .
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Table B: Mortgage Rate Regression with Sensitivity Measures for Banks only (median defined by request) 
Offered Mortgage Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sensitivity Measures
Constrained -4.4477***
(0.7415)
CCB*Constrained 4.9998***
(0.9769)
Mortgages/Equity Capital -0.9983
(0.8613)
CCB*Mortgages/Equity Capital 5.2898***
(0.8490)
Equity Capital/TA 6.0687***
(0.8036)
CCB*Equity Capital/TA -5.3629***
(0.8125)
Corporate Capital/TA -1.8063*
(0.9895)
CCB*Corporate Capital/TA 4.9641***
(0.8452)
Capital Reserves/TA 6.5858***
(0.8422)
CCB*Capital Reserves/TA -5.5689***
(0.8070)
∆Equity Capital -3.4667***
(0.5955)
CCB*∆Equity Capital 4.3064***
(0.9476)
∆Mortgages -4.5582***
(0.5924)
CCB*∆Mortgages 1.9115**
(0.8787)
Customer Funds/Mortgages 3.1210***
(0.6048)
CCB*Customer Funds/Mortgages -2.8956***
(0.8868)
ROE 0.3603
(0.9652)
CCB*ROE -0.9884
(0.8199)
Constant 191.8106***191.9504***188.1387***194.8207***187.6749***194.8675***193.9656***192.3980***192.6553***
(6.5472) (6.3357) (5.7286) (5.5800) (5.7184) (6.9342) (6.3859) (6.1538) (6.1903)
Observations 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955
R-squared 0.8202 0.8203 0.8219 0.8198 0.8222 0.8197 0.8214 0.8190 0.8176
Notes: This table s hows the resul ts of an OLS regress ion with the offered mortgage rate. The offered mortgage rate is meas ured in bas is points and winsorized at
the 1s t and 99th percenti le. Al l bank sens i tivi ty meas ures feature a (0/1) indicator of whether the bank is above the median among a l l participating banks for a
given request (except for Cons tra ined which refers to excess capita l i zation being below the median). Pleas e refer to Table 3 and the Descriptions of Main Variables
for more detai l s . Al l regres s ions include fixed effects for each reques t and for each offering bank. Heteros kedas tici ty consis tent standard errors in parentheses
with ***, ** and * denoting s igni ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level .
 
